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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Following a jury trial, the jury found David George Herod guilty of two counts of 
felony lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.  On each count, the district court 
imposed a concurrent unified sentence of twenty-five years, with seven years fixed.  
Mr. Herod appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it allowed 
one of the State’s expert witnesses, Alisa Ortega, to testify on how she determined 
whether an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the credibility of the 
complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s function. 
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued that Mr. Herod did not establish an 
abuse of discretion because Ms. Ortega’s challenged testimony was admissible 
evidence relevant to credibility and not an inadmissible opinion that a witness was 
telling the truth, and that any error was harmless.  (Resp. Br., pp.5-12.)  This Reply Brief 
is necessary to show the State’s argument ignores the distinction between expert 
testimony that merely assists the jury and testimony like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon 
the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Herod’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how 
she determined whether an allegation is false, because her testimony passed upon the 
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Mr. Herod asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed 
Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined whether an allegation is false, because 
Ms. Ortega’s testimony passed upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurped 
the jury’s function.  See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525 (2003). 
 
B. Ms. Ortega’s Testimony Passed Upon The Credibility Of The Complaining 
Witnesses And Thereby Usurped The Jury’s Function 
 
Mr. Herod asserts that Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether 
an allegation was false passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and 
thereby usurped the jury’s function.  Ms. Ortega’s testimony indirectly vouched for the 
truth of T.W.’s and A.M.’s accounts.  Her testimony was “useful to bolster [the 
witnesses’] credibility but [did] not provide the trier of fact with any additional 
information” that pertained to the case.  See Perry, 139 Idaho at 525.  Because 
credibility questions are left to the jury, the testimony did not “help the trier of fact to find 
facts or understand the evidence as required by I.R.E. 702.”  See id.  Put otherwise, 
with her testimony, Ms. Ortega “usurp[ed] the role of the jury as the ultimate finder of 
credibility.”  See id. 
The State recognizes that expert testimony is admissible up to the point where 
an expression of opinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of 
witnesses.  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  The State argues that “while a witness may not opine on 
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the truthfulness of another witness’ statement, an expert may impart knowledge that will 
assist the jury to make its own evaluation.”  (Resp. Br., p.7 (citing State v. Almaraz, 154 
Idaho 584, 599-600 (2013); State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 684-85 (Ct. App. 2012).)  
The State then contends that Ms. Ortega’s testimony was admissible because she “did 
not ‘venture beyond [the] point’ of ‘pass[ing] upon the credibility of witnesses or the 
weight of disputed evidence,’” but instead “merely provided many factors she employed 
when deciding whether to diagnose sexual abuse.”  (See Resp. Br., p.7.)   
The State’s argument ignores the distinction between expert testimony that 
merely assists the jury and testimony, like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon the credibility 
of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function.  The Almarez and Critchfield cases 
cited by the State (see Resp. Br., p.7), help illustrate the failings of the State’s 
argument.  While the State characterizes the holdings in Almarez and Critchfield as 
“expert opinion helping jury determine reliability of eyewitness identification admissible” 
(Resp. Br., p.7), the State’s gloss on those cases does not tell the full story. 
 In Almarez, the district court prohibited defense expert testimony on the 
suggestiveness of an officer’s interview procedures used to obtain an eyewitness 
identification in a first-degree murder case.  Almarez, 154 Idaho at 588-89.  The district 
court allowed the defense expert, a cognitive psychologist, to testify about the 
suggestiveness of the photographic lineup used by the officer, but ruled his expert 
opinion on the suggestiveness of the interview would invade the province of the jury.  Id. 
at 599.  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held “the district court abused its 
discretion when it ruled that [the defense expert] could not testify about the specific 
procedures used in [the eyewitness’] interview.”  Id. at 600.  The Almarez Court noted 
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“[t]he disallowed testimony offered by [the defense expert] was aimed at specific 
procedures employed by [the officer], and how empirical research has shown those 
procedures to be suggestive.  [The defense expert] was not offering an opinion on the 
credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony itself.”  Id. 
 In Critchfield, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial in a 
lewd conduct case on the basis that the district court should have allowed a defense 
expert in law enforcement interview techniques to testify on proper interview techniques, 
the purposes behind those techniques, and how improper techniques were used in the 
victim interviews at issue.  Critchfield, 153 Idaho at 682.  The State appealed from the 
district court’s order for a new trial, contending the defense expert’s testimony was 
properly excluded at the initial trial.  Id.  The State argued the defense expert’s 
testimony would be inadmissible as usurping the jury’s function or invading the province 
of the jurors, but the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected that argument.  Id. at 684-85.  The 
Critchfield Court held “the offer of proof regarding [the defense expert’s] proposed 
testimony did not include any such prohibited opinion on the credibility of any victim 
witness or on [the defendant’s] guilt.”  Id. at 684.  The proffered testimony was 
admissible because the defense expert “would critique the officers’ interview methods, 
not the alleged victims’ accuracy or honesty.”  Id. 
 The full story behind the Almarez and Critchfield holdings helps show the State’s 
argument ignores the distinction between expert testimony that merely assists the jury 
and testimony that passes upon the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the 
jury’s function.  The expert testimony in Almarez would have concerned “specific 
instances of police suggestiveness, which would have been helpful to the average 
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juror’s understanding of whether the interview was conducted in an overly suggestive 
way.”  Almarez, 154 Idaho at 600.  To the contrary, Ms. Ortega testified here regarding 
what details would lead her to conclude an allegation of child sexual abuse was 
probably true (Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.11-24), and the complaining witnesses provided those 
types of details at the trial.  (See App. Br., p.11.)   Thus, unlike the defense expert in 
Almarez, who did not offer an opinion on the credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness 
testimony itself, Ms. Ortega’s testimony indirectly vouched for the truth of T.W.’s and 
A.M.’s accounts.  Cf. Almarez, 154 Idaho at 600.  The Almarez Court emphasized 
“[c]redibility is an issue for the jury, as the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.”  Id. 
 Similar to Almarez, the offer of proof regarding the defense expert’s proposed 
testimony in Critchfield did not include any prohibited opinion on the credibility of any 
victim witness.  See Critchfield, 153 Idaho at 684.  In contrast, Ms. Ortega’s testimony 
spoke to the alleged victims’ accuracy or honesty.  Cf. id.  As discussed in the 
Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.11-13), such credibility determinations are not 
beyond the common experience of the jury, and the jury’s function is to make credibility 
determinations.  Thus, unlike the testimony in Almarez and Critchfield, Ms. Ortega’s 
testimony did not “help the trier of fact to find facts or understand the evidence as 
required by I.R.E. 702.”  See Perry, 139 Idaho at 525.   
 The State further argues that Mr. Herod’s assertion on appeal “was effectively 
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Blackstead, [126 Idaho 14, 21-22] 
(Ct. App. 1994).”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  However, the State has failed to mention the factual 
differences between the testimony at issue in Blackstead and Ms. Ortega’s testimony.  
Because of those factual differences, Blackstead is not controlling here. 
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 In Blackstead, the State called as an expert witness a licensed counselor, who 
specialized in the treatment of victims of childhood sexual abuse.  Blackstead, 126 
Idaho at 20.  The State’s expert testified about behavioral characteristics of sexual 
abuse victims, including delay in disclosing the abuse.  Id.  Before the State’s expert 
testified, an alleged victim had already testified as to why she delayed in reporting the 
defendant’s alleged sexual abuse.  Id. at 20-21.  On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
rejected the defendant’s “argument that [the State’s expert’s] testimony amounted to 
nothing more than vouching for the victim’s credibility and was cumulative to the victim’s 
own testimony,” because it “overlooks the distinction that merely opines as to the 
victim’s credibility and testimony which corroborates elements of the victim’s story or 
aids the jury in evaluating the victim’s truthfulness.”  Id. at 22. 
 The State’s treatment of Blackstead stops there (see Resp. Br., p.8), but again 
the State has not told the full story.  The State’s expert in Blackstead “had never 
interviewed [the alleged victim] or reviewed her records, and she offered no testimony 
directly addressing [the alleged victim’s] own experiences.  Neither did she present an 
opinion as to whether [the alleged victim’s] testimony was truthful, whether [the alleged 
victim] had been abused or by whom.”  Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 22.  Conversely, in the 
instant case Ms. Ortega conducted a physical examination of A.M. (Trial Tr., p.169, 
Ls.19-25,) and watched A.M.’s forensic interview.  (Trial Tr., p.158, Ls.15-17.)  During 
the physical examination, Ms. Ortega asked A.M. whether there had been any pain, 
hurt, or bleeding.  (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.8-12.)  Ms. Ortega also offered testimony on 
A.M.’s experiences as A.M. related them during the forensic interview.  (Trial Tr., p.158, 
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L.22 – p.165, L.2, p.167, L.13 – p.168, L.21.)  Further, Ms. Ortega presented an opinion 
as to whether A.M. had been sexually abused.  (Trial Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.2.) 
 Thus, there are key factual differences between the testimony at issue in 
Blackstead and Ms. Ortega’s testimony.  The Blackstead Court held the State’s expert’s 
testimony was properly admitted because the expert “gave the juror’s specialized 
knowledge that could help them evaluate the credibility of [the alleged victim’s] 
explanation as to why she failed to more promptly disclose the alleged abuse.  The 
expert did not, however, comment on [the alleged victim’s] veracity . . . .”  Blackstead, 
126 Idaho at 22.  In this case, rather than assist the jury with specialized knowledge, 
Ms. Ortega’s testimony went towards the veracity of the complaining witnesses. Cf. id. 
Because of the factual differences discussed above, Blackstead is not controlling here. 
Ms. Ortega’s testimony on how she determined whether an allegation was false 
passed upon the credibility of the complaining witnesses and thereby usurped the jury’s 
function.  The State’s argument to the contrary ignores the distinction between expert 
testimony that merely assists the jury and testimony like Ms. Ortega’s, that passes upon 
the credibility of witnesses and thereby usurps the jury’s function.  The district court 
abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Ortega to testify on how she determined 
whether an allegation is false. 
 
C. The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving The District Court’s Abuse Of 
Discretion Was Harmless 
 
Mr. Herod asserts the State has not met its burden of proving the district court’s 
abuse of discretion in allowing Ms. Ortega’s challenged testimony was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  To the extent the 
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State’s harmlessness argument relies upon its incomplete characterization of 
Blackstead (see Resp. Br., pp.10-11), its argument should be rejected because 
Blackstead is not controlling here. 
The State’s harmlessness argument is otherwise unremarkable, and Mr. Herod 
would thus direct this Court’s attention to Pages 14-15 of the Appellant’s Brief. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Herod respectfully requests this Court reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
 DATED this 26th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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